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Abstract
How large are government spending and tax multipliers? The scal proxy-
SVAR literature provides heterogenous estimates, depending on which proxies -
scal or non-scal - are used to identify scal shocks. We reconcile the existing
estimates via a exible vector autoregressive model that allows to achieve identi-
cation in presence of a number of structural shocks larger than that of the available
instruments. Our two main ndings are the following. First, the estimate of the
tax multiplier is sensitive to the assumption of orthogonality between total factor
productivity (non-scal proxy) and tax shocks. If this correlation is assumed to
be zero, the tax multiplier is found to be around one. If such correlation is non-
zero, as supported by our empirical evidence, we nd a tax multiplier three times
as large. Second, we nd the spending multiplier to be robustly larger than one
across di¤erent models that feature di¤erent sets of instruments. Our results are
robust to the joint employment of di¤erent scal and non-scal instruments.
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scal policy, identication, instruments, struc-
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Non-technical summary
We conduct a proxy-SVAR analysis to quantify the size of the scal spend-
ing and tax multipliers in the US. We do so by employing an empirical strat-
egy which enables the econometrician to: i) accommodate situations in which
one proxy is used to instrument more than one shock; ii) exploit more proxies
in a joint fashion to instrument a single shock. The proxy-SVAR is denoted
AC-SVAR, where A stands for "Augmented" and C for "Constrained". The
"Augmented" part refers to the fact that the VAR of interest is augmented by
appending a structure taking care of the dynamics of the instruments. The
"Constrained" part refers to zero constraints that we impose to deal with
a manageable structure (e.g., we assume that the lags of the instruments
do not enter the equations of the economic variables of interest, which are
public spending, tax revenues, and output in our analysis). The analysis is
conducted with a frequentist approach that, under given restrictions, enables
us to jointly test for the relevance of the instruments and for the structure
of the VAR as a whole.
A natural question is: Why yet another proxy-SVAR paper on scal mul-
tipliers? Because, so far, the literature has provided conicting results, and
part of this conict is related to the instruments used in some reference analy-
sis, and to the way such instruments have been coupled with the reference
VAR. A clear example regards the tax multiplier. A series of papers by Karel
Mertens and Morten Ravn (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) exploit a narrative in-
strument for tax changes in the US, and point to a tax multiplier as large
as 3. This multiplier is associated to a large output-tax elasticity, which is
also larger than 3. Quite di¤erently, a recent paper by Caldara and Kamps
(2017) employs TFP shocks as an instrument to output shocks, via which
the authors recover the tax multiplier (by exploiting the information carried
by the covariance matrix of the estimated VAR residuals). They nd a tax
multiplier lower than one, and an output-tax elasticity close to 2. Given
the relevance played by assumptions on the rscal multiplier for scal policy
decisions, it is imperative to dig deeper and understand whats behind the
di¤erence between Mertens and Ravns vs. Caldara and Kampsndings.
Tax multiplier: Findings. Our ndings are the following. First, using
the same instruments employed by Mertens and Ravn on the one hand (in
particular, their narrative tax changes series purged by expected variations,
something which is done to focus on unexpected changes in tax revenues),
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and Caldara and Kamps on the other (TFP à la Fernald (2014)), we are able
to replicate their results, i.e., a multiplier around 3 in the former paper, and
below one in the latter. Second, we show that Caldara and Kampsnding
is driven by the questionable TFP-tax shocks orthogonality assumption they
have to entertain for their machinery to work. Using their very same data,
we show that such assumption is rejected by the data. Moreover, we show
that, when modeling the TFP-tax shocks correlation (which is fundamentally
driven by the systematic contemporaneous response of tax revenues to out-
put uctuations), the tax multiplier one nds by using the TFP instrument
turns out to be three times as large, and takes a value pretty close to the one
found by Mertens and Ravn in their investigations. Crucial to this nding is
the impact that directly modeling the TFP-tax shocks correlation has got on
the output-tax elasticity, which moves from close to 2 (assumption of orthog-
onality) to larger than 3 (non-orthogonality allowed). Our Appendix shows
the downward bias the output-tax elasticity is a¤ected by if one does not
model the above mentioned correlation in a world in which such correlation
is di¤erent from zero. Our ndings on the key role played by the assumption
of orthogonality between TFP and tax shocks are robust to the joint use of
multiple instruments and to di¤erent specications of the VAR we employ
(in particular, adding ination and a policy rate does not a¤ect our main
ndings, and using instruments such as oil shocks and spending shocks does
not a¤ect our results). Our empirical results conrm the positive correlation
between the output-tax elasticity and the tax multiplier already found by
Mertens and Ravn (2014) and Caldara and Kamps (2017).
Fiscal spending multiplier: Findings. Turning to the scal spending
multiplier, our proxy-SVAR analysis points to a multiplier larger than one
(in the 1.6-2.1 range). This nding is robust to modeling (or not) the above
mentioned TFP-tax shocks correlation, as well as to using di¤erent instru-
ments, among which a novel instrument obtained by purging Rameys (2011)
news shocks by its predictable component in order to have an instrument for
unexpected changes in scal spending (this idea resambles the one already
pursued by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko in their 2012 AEJEP paper). Also,
our results are robust to adding ination and a policy rate to the VAR, and
also to jointly using TFP shocks, scal spending shocks, and oil shocks as
instruments in our analysis.
Precision of our estimates. As stated above, we nd a tax multi-
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plier larger than 3, and a spending multiplier between 1.6 and 2.1. However,
while the latter is fairly precisely estimated, the former is quite unprecisely
estimated, and our 68% bands (computed as suggested by ? to take the
censoring of some of the instruments into account) cover a large range of
values. We believe this nding to be informative for policymakers who are
risk averse. When deciding over the optimal scal policy mix, policymakers
should take into account not only the point estimates of these two multipli-
ers, but also the statistical uncertainty surrounding them. It may very well
be that risk-averse policymakers would prefer to use public spending as their
main policy tool, given the much larger uncertainty surrounding the tax mul-
tiplier. We see a project on optimal scal policy under uncertain multipliers
as the natural continuation of this project.
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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 shock is predicted to generate a sizeable recession in the US and around
the world (International Monetary Fund (2020)). While an immediate response by scal
(as well as monetary) policymakers has been implemented, other interventions to sustain
aggregate demand are likely to be needed in the remainder of 2020 and the following
years. Such interventions should be designed on the basis of assumptions on the scal
multipliers, whose quantication is a di¢ cult task. The reason is that spending and tax
revenues are in large part endogenous, and tackling this endogeneity issue to identify
the output e¤ects of exogenous variations in scal variables - i.e., scal shocks - is
challenging.
One way to identify causal e¤ects that has recently gained a lot of traction is the
"proxy-SVAR" (or "SVAR-IV") approach, which relies on the use of instruments for
the identication of the shocks of interest (see Stock and Watson (2012) and Mertens
and Ravn (2013) for early contributions, and Stock and Watson (2018) for a review).1
Using a measure of unanticipated exogenous variations in tax revenues constructed
via a narrative approach, Romer and Romer (2010) and Mertens and Ravn (2011b,
2012, 2013, 2014) nd tax multipliers between 2 and 3.2 Di¤erently, Caldara and
Kamps (2017) employ Fernalds (2014) measure of total factor productivity (TFP) to
identify exogenous changes of output in scal policy rules. Conditional on these rules,
they recover the scal policy shocks of interest and their business cycle e¤ects. Their
estimates of the tax multiplier range between 0.5 and 0.7, while that of the spending
multiplier is 1-1.3. While Caldara and Kamps(2017) estimates of the tax multiplier
are substantially smaller than those provided by the papers mentioned above, those of
the spending multiplier are larger than the ones documented in the papers surveyed
by Ramey (2019), which point to a 0.6-1 range. In light of policymakersneed to get
reliable and robust indications on the size and relative strength of the spending and
tax multipliers, the heterogeneity of the estimates provided by the extant literature is
problematic.
Contributions of our paper. This paper employs both scal and non-scal in-
1We will use the terms "instruments" and "proxies" interchangeably throughout the paper.
2Lower gures are obtained by Favero and Giavazzi (2012), who estimate a tax multiplier similar to
Blanchard and Perottis (2002), and Perotti (2012), who nds a tax multiplier larger than Blanchard
and Perottis (2002) but smaller that those documented in the text. For a discussion on the reasons
behind the discrepancies between Mertens and Ravns set of estimates, Favero and Giavazzis, and
Perottis, see Mertens and Ravn (2014).
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struments in a proxy-SVAR setting and makes two contributions to the literature. First,
we show that the assumption of orthogonality (exogeneity) between the non scal proxy
(TFP as in Caldara and Kamps (2017)) and the tax shocks is key in determining the
size of the tax multiplier. If we entertain this assumption, we get tax multipliers in the
range of 0.5 and 0.7. Di¤erently, if the orthogonality condition is relaxed (something
we can do in our multivariate framework), the data: i) point to a negative and signif-
icant correlation between TFP and tax shocks; ii) imply a tax multiplier larger than
3. Second, we nd a scal spending multiplier larger than one. This estimate is very
robust to the use of di¤erent instruments and modeling specications.
Methodology. We obtain these results by working with a exible proxy-SVAR
methodology recently proposed by Angelini and Fanelli (2019) and termed "augmented
and constrained SVAR" (AC-SVAR). In short, the AC-SVAR jointly models both the
variables of interest (e.g., scal spending, tax revenues, and output) and the proxies
used to identify the shocks of interest. This approach has three main advantages over
alternatives scal proxy-SVARs. First, it enables us to trade relatively uncontroversial
zero restrictions (e.g., the zero contemporaneous response of scal spending to output as
in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), or the zero response of tax revenues to scal spending
shocks as in Caldara and Kamps (2017)) with the possibility of instrumenting more
than one shock with one proxy.3 This is of particular importance in our analysis, as it
allows us to unveil the negative correlation between the TFP proxy and the tax shocks
in the data and, consequently, to reconcile the di¤erent estimates of the tax multiplier
obtained in the literature. Second, our approach easily accommodates the case in which
multiple instruments are used to identify multiple shocks. Third, it enables us to test
the validity of the proxy-SVAR specication (validity of instruments included) without
resorting to information outside the VAR framework at work.
Instruments. Our baseline exercises are conducted by using three di¤erent instru-
ments. The rst one is the unanticipated tax shocks proposed by Mertens and Ravn
(2011b). They isolate the unanticipated component of the tax shocks series originally
constructed by Romer and Romer (2010), who identify exogenous variations in tax
policy decisions via their reading of narrative records. The second one is a version of
the scal spending shocks proposed by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), which we
obtain by estimating an expectations-augmented scal VAR in which news spending
3Section 3 provides an illustrative example on how our methodology works when one instrument is
used to simultaneously proxy two shocks.
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shocks à la Ramey (2011) are allowed to exert a contemporaneous impact on scal
spending.4 To our knowledge, ours is the rst exercise in which a proxy for unexpected
scal spending shocks is used to estimate the US scal spending multiplier in a proxy-
SVAR context. In this sense, our contribution complements the one by Ramey (2011),
who focuses on the output response to anticipated scal spending shocks.5 The third
instrument we use in our analysis is the factor utilization-adjusted total factor produc-
tivity series produced by Fernald (2014), which - following Caldara and Kamps (2017) -
we exploit to identify shocks to the business cycle. Finally, in an extended version of the
model that also features ination, we use a fourth instrument, i.e., the oil shocks series
proposed by Hamilton (2003) to instrument ination shocks. While we use the rst two
proxies to directly identify the scal shocks of interest, the latter two instruments carry
information for the identication of non-scal shocks that, via the moments related to
the covariance matrix of the scal SVAR, can be exploited to identify scal elastici-
ties and, consequently, spending and tax multipliers. Importantly, the assessment of
the statistical uncertainty surrounding our point estimates is undertaken by computing
condence bands via the Moving Block Bootstrap (MBB) resampling scheme proposed
by Jentsch and Lunsford (2019a), which suitably takes into account the distributional
properties of the VAR innovations and of the proxies used in our analysis.6
Findings. Our point estimates of the scal spending multiplier fall in the 1.6-2.1
range. These point estimates, which are supported by di¤erent sets of instruments
and model specications, are statistically in line with the one by Caldara and Kamps
(2017), who work with non-scal instruments only, Canova and Pappa (2007), who
work with sign restrictions in a panel SVAR framework modeling US and EU data, and
Leeper, Traum, and Walker (2017), who work with di¤erent micro-founded structural
frameworks. Our estimates also support the 1.6 gure used by Christina Romer - at
4The idea is to purge the one-step ahead scal spending forecast error by the component which can
actually be anticipated on the basis of narrative records. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) is the
rst paper conducting a VAR exercise with this measure. They use real-time professional forecasts,
available since 1966, to control for expectations not already absorbed by their VAR. Our choice of
using Rameys (2011) news spending shock as a control is due to its availability, which covers the
entire sample we work with (1950Q1-2006Q4).
5Ramey and Zubairy (2018) estimate the multiplier generated by anticipated scal spending shocks
with a local projections approach. See Plagborg-Møller and Wolf (2018) on the mapping between local
projections and proxy-SVARs.
6The MBB correctly reconstructs the variability of estimated impulse response functions in sit-
uations featuring conditional heteroskedasticity in VAR innovations and/or zero-censored proxy as
Mertens and Ravns. Section 3 elaborates on this point. For a discussion on this resampling scheme
vs. alternatives, see Brüggemann, Jentsch, and Trenkler (2016), Jentsch and Lunsford (2019b) and
Mertens and Ravn (2019).
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the time Chair of President Obamas Council of Economic Advisers - to predict the
job gains possibly generated by the stimulus package approved by the US Congress in
February 2009.7
Turning to the tax multiplier, depending on the model specication and the instru-
ments we rely upon, we can support point estimates ranging from 0.7 to 3.6. First, we
show that our proxy-SVAR framework exactly replicates the "high" tax multiplier by
Romer and Romers (2010) and Mertens and Ravns (2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014) and the
"low" tax multiplier estimated by Caldara and Kamps (2017) when using their instru-
ments in isolation (respectively, a narrative measure of tax shocks and a measure of
TFP). Crucially, the latter estimate - the 0.7 value of the peak realization of the tax
multiplier - is obtained under the assumption that the TFP proxy is orthogonal to the
tax shock. However, economic intuition suggests that shocks driving the business cycle
might also be behind uctuations in tax revenues.8 In our context, this implies that the
TFP proxy could be also correlated with tax shocks, other than output shocks. One of
the advantages of our approach is that we can relax the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality
condition if other (testable) restrictions are met, so that we can use the TFP proxy to
simultaneously instrument output and tax shocks. When we do so, we nd a striking
result, i.e., our estimate of the tax multiplier moves from 0.7 to 3.6. Interestingly, this
estimate is in line with the 3.7 multiplier found by Mertens and Ravn (2011a), who
estimate the response of the US tax revenues to a technology shock identied with
long-run restrictions.
Role of the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition. Why does relaxing
the orthogonality condition drive the multiplier upward? The rationale for this result
is the impact of the correlation between TFP and tax shocks on the estimate of the
output-tax revenues elasticity. Our model points to a tax elasticity around 3.8. When
imposing orthogonality between TFP and tax shocks, the estimate of the output-tax
elasticity drops to 2.1. This latter gure is basically the same as the one employed
by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and provided by the OECD (Giorno, Richardson,
Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995)), which is 2.08. However, as pointed out by
7See https://voxeu.org/article/determining-size-scal-multiplier. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Colombo, and Nodari (2015), and Ghas-
sibe and Zanetti (2019) nd this multiplier to be larger in recessions. For contrasting evidence, see
Ramey and Zubairy (2018). Evidence on state-dependent output e¤ects of tax shocks is provided by
Sims and Wol¤ (2018).
8Mountford and Uhlig (2009) identify "business cycle" shocks by assuming them to generate a
positive conditional correlation between output and tax revenues. They point out that this assumption
is consistent with a number of theoretical views.
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Mertens and Ravn (2014), such estimate is likely to be a¤ected by endogeneity issues
related to the estimation of the tax base-tax revenues and the output-tax base elasticities
across di¤erent categories of tax revenues. Our exercises support Mertens and Ravns
(2014) reasoning. Also, our results conrm the link between output-tax elasticities
and tax multiplier already unveiled by Mertens and Ravn (2014) (via counterfactual
simulations) and Caldara and Kamps (2017) (via analytical derivations).
Robustness to the use of multiple instruments. A natural question at this
point is: Are our ndings robust to the joint use of multiple instruments? We address
this question by estimating an extended version of our proxy-SVAR that also includes
ination and a policy rate. We identify shocks by using all four proxies contemporane-
ously, i.e., the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) proxy for the scal spending shock,
the Mertens and Ravn (2012) proxy for the tax shock, the TFP proxy for the output
shock and, depending on the specication, the tax shock, and the Hamilton (2003) oil
shocks proxy for the ination shock. Even when multiple instruments are at play, our
ndings are: i) the crucial role played by the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition
is conrmed when using multiple instruments; ii) when relaxing the TFP-tax shocks
orthogonality assumption, a larger tax elasticity and a tax multiplier larger than three
arise.
While the modeling of the TFP-tax shocks correlation is crucial to unveil a large
tax multiplier, such correlation does not seem to play any signicant role when it comes
to quantifying the spending multiplier. Such multiplier is actually pretty robust across
di¤erent sets of proxies. Why? The intuition goes back to the central role played
by scal elasticities. While the output-tax elasticity is sensitive to assumptions about
the moment conditions relating instruments and VAR innovations, the output-spending
elasticity is not. The reason is that the latter is close to zero in the data, a result in line
with the institutional characteristics of the US system (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)).
Hence, the endogeneity issue, if present, is much less severe for the estimation of the
output-spending elasticity and, therefore, the spending multiplier.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how our paper relates to the
extant literature. Section 3 presents the methodology, the data, and the way in which
we compute the multipliers. Section 4 documents our results. Section 5 documents
some robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
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2 Relation to the literature
Our work is related to the scal proxy-SVAR literature that has used scal and non-
scal instruments to quantify the size of the spending and the tax multiplier. The use
of TFP shocks as an instrument to compute scal multipliers is inspired by Caldara and
Kamps (2017). Their analysis of the scal multipliers features two parts. First, they
show that the heterogeneity of estimates of the scal multipliers in the literature can
be explained by the di¤erent scal elasticities implied by the di¤erent methodologies
at work (zero restrictions, sign restrictions, proxy-SVARs). Then, they use non-scal
instruments to estimate scal elasticities and work out the scal multipliers by exploit-
ing the information coming from the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals. They
nd the scal spending multiplier to be larger than one and bigger than the tax multi-
plier. We reach a similar conclusion on the scal spending multiplier, but a strikingly
di¤erent one on the tax multiplier. As explained above, this di¤erence is due to the dif-
ferent assumption on the TFP instrument-tax shocks relationship, i.e., the imposition
of orthogonality by Caldara and Kamps (2017) that we do not entertain. Several other
elements separate our investigation from theirs. First, we jointly employ scal and non-
scal instruments to estimate the multipliers. Doing so enables us to show that, while
the estimate of the scal spending multiplier is robust across di¤erent sets of proxies,
that of the tax multiplier is not. A second, related point is that, for the estimation of
the latter multiplier, we unveil that relaxing the orthogonality (exogeneity) of the TFP
instrument to tax shocks is crucial for correctly estimating the output e¤ects of tax cuts.
Third, our methodology enables us to formally assess the validity of the instruments we
use without appealing to information external to that of the original VAR and of the
external instruments already used to identify the targeted shocks. Di¤erently, Caldara
and Kamps (2017) need to appeal to scal instruments to test the exogeneity (orthogo-
nality) of the non-scal instruments they use as proxies in their approach. Fourth, our
AC-SVAR representation of proxy-SVARs enables us to work with overidentied mod-
els and formally test some of the restrictions imposed by the literature, e.g., the zero
output-spending elasticity imposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012). Fifth, we cover the case of the estimation of the scal spending
multiplier related to an unexpected scal spending shock, which they do not study.
Our analysis is related to recent contributions by Karel Mertens and Morten Ravn.
We share with Mertens and Ravn (2013) the idea of using narratives on exogenous
variations in tax revenues to directly identify US tax shocks. However, our method
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allows us to jointly instrument scal and non-scal shocks, with the advantage of not
being committed to Cholesky-type constraints when multiple instruments are used to
identify multiple shocks. Because of this exibility, we can account for cases where
one proxy may instrument more than one structural shock, a crucial fact behind our
empirical results. We share with Mertens and Ravn (2014) the idea that the proxy-
SVAR approach is not necessarily conned to a "partial identication" approach. This
means that if the proxies are properly combined with a few additional restrictions that
characterize the on-impact coe¢ cients associated with the non-instrumented shocks, one
can identify all structural shocks of the system, not just the instrumented ones. Mertens
and Ravn (2014) exploit this strategy in Section 3 of their article (p. 60), where to
identify all shocks of their SVAR they complement the restrictions provided by the proxy
used to identify the tax shock with one additional restriction, represented by the non-
instantaneous reaction of government spending to changes in economic activity. Doing
so, they not only identify the tax shock but also track the dynamic causal e¤ects of scal
spending shocks on output. However, while Mertens and Ravn (2014) instrument the
tax shock only, our AC-SVAR model features specications in which both the tax and
scal spending shocks (as well as non-scal shocks) are instrumented jointly. Moreover,
while the estimation in both Mertens and Ravn (2013) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) is
based on instrumental variable methods, we rely on maximum likelihood, which is one of
the benets of representing the proxy-SVAR in the AC-SVAR form. This is important,
as we can use likelihood ratio tests as the "metric" for the empirical evaluation of the
estimated proxy-SVARs in presence of overidentication restrictions.
The focus of this paper is on the output e¤ects of unexpected variations in scal
spending and taxes. Classic papers in this area are Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who
rely on zero restrictions and institutional information about the US tax and transfer
system to identify scal shocks. They nd a scal spending multiplier larger or smaller
than the tax multiplier depending on details of the VAR specication. Di¤erently,
Mountford and Uhlig (2009) work with sign restrictions and nd a large tax multiplier
and a spending multiplier lower than one. Our paper complements the analysis on
the scal multipliers due to changes in announced future scal policies (see, among
others, Fisher and Peters (2010), Ramey (2011), Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2013),
Ricco (2016), Forni and Gambetti (2016), Ben Zeev and Pappa (2017)). It also comple-
ments the recent investigations on the output e¤ects of debt consolidation plans, which
are surveyed in Alesina, Favero, and Giavazzi (2018, 2019). In line with most of the
literature, this paper deals with the output e¤ects of shocks to federal tax revenues.
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Papers dealing with narrower denitions of tax shocks are Barro and Redlick (2011)
and Mertens and Ravn (2013). Our focus is on the e¤ects of scal shocks on aggregate
output. Papers dealing with the distributional e¤ects of scal shocks are Mertens and
Montiel Olea (2018) and Zidar (2019).
Our analysis unveils the source of the heterogeneneity in the empirical estimates of
tax multipliers. A related contribution is Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2012),
who show that the di¤erent tax multipliers obtained by Blanchard and Perotti (2002)
- close to 1 - and Romer and Romer (2010) - around 3 - are not due to the di¤erent
reduced-form representations of their econometric models (a VAR in the former case
vs. a local projection equation in the latter). They point to the di¤erent identication
assumptions behind the two approaches as the source of the di¤erent estimates of the
tax multiplier. Within the proxy-SVAR class, our paper sheds light on the role played by
di¤erent identication schemes in delivering substantially di¤erent estimates of the tax
multiplier. Moreover, it shows that such di¤erent identication schemes are signicantly
more problematic for the estimation of the tax multiplier than for that of the scal
spending multiplier.
3 Methodology, data and multipliers
AC-SVAR: Identication. Consider the following reduced-form VAR system
(L)Yt = ut (1)
where Yt is a vector of n observables, (L)  In   1L   2L2   :::   pLp is the
matrix polynomial collecting the coe¢ cients associated with the p lags of the variables
(Yt p = LpYt), and ut is the vector of innovations with covariance matrix E(utu0t) = u.
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Let the mapping between the vector of innovations ut and that of structural shocks
"t be
ut = B"t (2)
where it is assumed that E("t"0t) = In. We focus on the identication of a subset of
k  n structural shocks "1;t, where "t = ("01;t; "02;t)0. "1;t collects the k shocks of primary
interest of the analysis, which in our framework are the scal shocks (spending shock
and tax shock), but possibly also non-scal shocks. "2;t collects the remaining n   k
9Constants and other deterministic terms are omitted for brevity. The extension of our formal
expressions to cases in which constants and deterministic trends are present is straightforward.
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non-scal structural shocks of the system.10 Then, without loss of generality, we can
re-write the mapping (2) in the form
ut = B1"1;t +B2"2;t (3)
where B = (B1 , B2), B1 contains the instantaneous impact coe¢ cients associated with
the shocks in "1;t, and B2 pertains to the instantaneous impact coe¢ cients associated
with the shocks in "2;t: We have ordered the shocks "1;t rst for convenience: as it will
be clear below, the ordering of the variables is irrelevant in our framework.
Assume that a vector of k instruments vz;t for the shock "1;t is available. For such
instruments to be valid, the following two conditions have to hold:
E(vz;t"
0
1;t) =  , rank() = k (4)
E(vz;t"
0
2;t) = 0k(n k): (5)
Condition (4) states that the k instruments have to be relevant, i.e., signicantly cor-
related with the k structural shocks of interest.  is a k  k full column rank matrix
containing "relevance" parameters, and the rank condition in (4) implies that each
column of  is non-zero and carries important information on the shocks in "1;t. Con-
dition (5) states that in the absence of further restrictions, the instruments have to be
orthogonal to the non-instrumented shocks. The conditions (4)-(5) can be conveniently
summarized for our purposes via the expression
vz;t = "1;t + !t (6)
which establishes that the instruments are connected to the instrumented structural
shocks via the matrix ; up to the measurement error term !t: The measurement error
is assumed to be independent on "t = ("01;t; "
0
2;t)
0 and has covariance matrix !:
Angelini and Fanelli (2019) propose a novel approach to the identication and esti-
mation of proxy-SVARs. They work with an augmented system that jointly accounts
for the observables Yt and the instruments vz;t  Zt E(Ztj Ft 1), where Zt collect the
"raw" variables the instruments are constructed upon, and Ft 1 is the econometricians
10In our framework, the number of instrumented shocks k can be equal to the number of variables
of the VAR n. Our framework covers the case "1;t  "t, meaning that we can potentially instrument
all structural shocks of the system. This is a novelty in the proxy-SVAR literature, which will be fully
explored in our empirical exercises presented below. See also the example in the text.
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information set at time t  1. They denote the resulting model with the acronym AC-
SVAR, where "A" stands for "augmented" and "C" for "constrained" because of the
(zero) constraints the model features. The AC-SVAR model reads as follows:11
(L) 0nk
 (L) (L)

Yt
Zt

=

ut
vz;t

(7)
where  (L) and (L) are matrix polynomials as (L) in the VAR (1), with  (L) 
 1L +  2L
2 + ::: +  sL
s and (L)  Ik   1L   2L2   :::   qLq. The AC-SVAR
model allows the variables Zt to be persistent (via (L)), and possibly the lags of Yt to
be predictors of Zt (via  (L)). Obviously,  (L) = 0kn and (L) = Ik when vz;t  Zt,
i.e., when the external instruments are already expressed in innovation form and need
not be ltered out on past information.12
In the AC-SVAR model, the relationships between innovations, instruments and
shocks is obtained by coupling (3) with (6). The resulting system is the following:

ut
vz;t

=

B1 B2 0nk
 0k(n k) 
1=2
!

eG
0@ "1;t"2;t
!ot
1A (8)
where !ot denotes the measurement error term !t in (6) normalized to have unit vari-
ance.13
System (7)-(8) can be written in compact form. Consider the following denitions:
Wt 

Yt
Zt

, t 

ut
vz;t

; e	(L)   (L) 0nk
 (L) (L)

; eG   B1 B2 0nk
 0k(n k) 
1=2
!

whereWt and t are (n+k)-dimensional, and "" indicates that e	(L) and eG incorporate
11A detailed exposition of the properties of the AC-SVAR approach can be found in Angelini and
Fanelli (2019). We use their notation to facilitate the mapping between their derivations and our
presentation of their framework and its properties.
12Given the large number of coe¢ cients featured by the system of equations (7), in the empirical
analyses presented below we impose that (L) is diagonal when k > 1, i.e., the instruments are
assumed to be dynamically unrelated to each other. These restrictions are supported by the data, i.e.,
the (cross-)correlations among the instruments used throughout the analysis are statistically equal to
zero. Furthermore, in all estimated models discussed below the lag order q of (L) and s of  (L) is
set to four, in line with the VAR lag order p.
13Formally, 1=2! in (8) is a symmetric positive denite matrix such that the variance of the mea-
surement error !t = 
1=2
! !ot is equal to !: In our setup 
1=2
! could also correspond to the Cholesky
factor of !, see Angelini and Fanelli (2019) for details.
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by construction a set of zero restrictions. Then, system (7)-(8) can be expressed as:
e	(L)Wt = t (9)
t = eGt (10)
where E(t
0
t) =  =

u 
0
u;vz
u;vz !

, and E(t
0
t) = In+k.
Equations (9)-(10) represent the proxy-SVAR as a "larger" SVAR system. Formally
it reads as a structural "B-model" (Lütkepohl (2005)) characterized by a certain num-
ber of zero restrictions in the autoregressive coe¢ cients e	(L), and in the matrix of
"structural parameters" eG:14 From eq. (10), the covariance restrictions are given by
 = eG eG0 (11)
and it is easily seen that these generate, among others, the "core" covariance restrictions
of proxy-SVAR analysis vz ;u = B
0
1 (see, among others, Stock and Watson (2012),
Mertens and Ravn (2013), Stock and Watson (2018), and Angelini and Fanelli (2019)).
The matrix eG in (10) fully incorporates the restrictions implied by the k instruments
used for "1;t. The relevance condition (4) is captured by the non-zero coe¢ cients that
enter the matrix  in the (2,1) block of eG; the orthogonality (exogeneity) conditions
(5) correspond to the block of k(n   k) zeros in the position (2,2) of eG. However, the
relevance and orthogonality conditions are not su¢ cient alone to recover all structural
shocks in "t = ("01;t; "
0
2;t)
0. Angelini and Fanelli (2019) derive the necessary and su¢ cient
rank conditions and the necessary order conditions for this to happen, and show that it
is necessary to impose some "additional" constraints on the coe¢ cients of B1,  and B2
that form the matrix eG in (8). (See also the Supplementary Appendix in Olea, Stock,
and Watson (2020).)
Two remarks are in order. First, our analysis covers the case r = n, namely we
can potentially instrument all the structural shocks of the scal SVAR, a novelty in
the proxy-SVAR literature which we will employ in Section 4.4. Second, while for
k > 1 the matrix of relevance parameters  must be nonsingular, it needs not be
diagonal, meaning that a single instrument in vz;t, say vz;i;t, may instrument not only
the structural shocks "1;i;t but, potentially, also other shocks in "1;t.15 More important,
14See Arias, Rubio-Ramírez, and Waggoner (2018) for a similar specication based on the "A-model"
and a Bayesian approach.
15Similarly, Mertens and Ravn (2013) consider narrative accounts of shocks to average personal
income (PI) and corporate income (CI) tax rates for the US to identify two tax shocks (k = 2),
and observe that (p. 1223) "it appears inappropriate to treat the narrative PI (CI) tax changes as
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under certain restrictions on the coe¢ cients of B1,  and B2 that form the matrix eG
in (8), our analysis features cases where some proxies may violate the orthogonality
condition. In other words, proxies used to instrument the shocks in "1;t may potentially
instrument also some of the shocks in "2;t, a scenario which is best understood by the
simple example discussed next.
If the SVAR model (9)-(10) is identied, the matrix eG (as well as the non-zero
parameters in e	(L)) can be estimated via maximum likelihood.16 When the restrictions
on eG are overidentifying, likelihood ratio tests for the overidentication restrictions
provide an empirical assessment of the estimated proxy-SVAR.
AC-SVAR: One proxy for two structural shocks. To shed light on our ap-
proach, we discuss a specic example where one proxy is used to instrument two shocks.
We build our argument in two steps, starting with the standard case of one instrument
for one shock before moving to the one proxy - two shocks case. Anticipating what we
will do in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, suppose we use a measure of TFP as instrument for the
output shock. Then, the counterpart of (3) in our baseline model reads as follows:0@ utrtugt
uyt
1A =
0@ btr;tr btr;gbg;tr bg;g
by;tr by;g
1A
B2

"trt
"gt

+
0@ btr;ybg;y
by;y
1A
B1
"yt ; (12)
where ut = (utrt ; u
g
t ; u
y
t )
0 is the vector of the VAR innovations, utrt is the disturbance
associated with the equation for tax revenues, ugt is the disturbance associated with
the equation for scal spending, uyt is the disturbance associated with the equation for
output, "trt and "
g
t denote the tax and the scal spending shock (respectively), and "
y
t is
the output shock, which in this example is directly instrumented (k = 1) by the TFP
proxy. Such proxy is denoted vTFPt , and the counterpart of (6) is given by the equation
vTFPt = 1"
y
t + !
TFP
t (13)
where 1 = Cov(v
TFP
t ; "
y
t ) is the relevance parameter which captures the connection
between the TFP proxy and the output shock, and !TFPt is the associated measurement
uncorrelated with exogenous shocks to the corporate (personal) tax rate". Thus, Mertens and Ravn
(2013) estimate a "full" matrix  (not a diagonal one) and impose the additional restrictions necessary
to identify the two shocks other the two proxies elsewhere in their proxy-SVAR.
16When the restrictions that characterize eG are zero constraints, separable across columns, a conve-
nient way to study the identication of the proxy-SVAR is to check whether the su¢ cient conditions for
global identication in Theorem 2 of Rubio-Ramírez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010) are met. See Angelini
and Fanelli (2019) for some examples.
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error with standard deviation !;TFP . As is known from standard proxy-SVAR analysis,
the TFP proxy alone would su¢ ce to identify the output shock under the condition 1 6=
0. However, to estimate the scal multipliers, we need to achieve "full identication",
i.e., we also have to identify the non-instrumented scal shocks in "2;t  ("trt ; "gt )0. To do
so, we need at least one additional restriction other than the proxy, and in this example
identication is achieved by properly restricting the coe¢ cients b; in the block B2 in
(12). We consider two constraints. First, btr;g = 0, which maintains that tax revenues
do not instantaneously respond (within the quarter) to the scal spending shock. By
imposing btr;g = 0, we obtain a just identied model. Second, following Blanchard and
Perotti (2002) and Mertens and Ravn (2014), we posit that scal spending does not
react contemporaneously (within the quarter) to changes in economic activity captured
by the output shock, i.e. bg;y = 0 in the block B1 in (12). Overall, the TFP proxy and
the conditions btr;g = 0 and bg;y = 0 imply the following structure for the matrix eG in
(8):
eG =
0BB@
btr;tr 0 btr;y 0
bg;tr bg;g 0 0
by;tr by;g by;y 0
0 0 1 !;TFP
1CCA : (14)
It can be shown that the AC-SVAR model in (14) is overidentied, which implies that
it is testable.17
We next move to the case of interest, where one proxy is used to instrument for two
shocks. Economic intuition suggests that tax revenues are cyclical, hence TFP shocks
may be behind their volatility as well. In this case, the equation for the TFP proxy
becomes
vTFPt = 1"
y
t + 2"
tr
t + !
TFP
t (15)
where 1 has the same interpretation as before, while 2 = Cov(v
TFP
t ; "
tr
t ) is the rele-
vance parameter which captures the relationship between the TFP proxy and the tax
shock. Equation (15) relaxes the orthogonality of the TFP proxy to the tax shock and
keeps the orthogonality to the scal spending shock unchanged. Is the model identied?
Now, the counterpart of the matrix eG in (8) is:
eG =
0BB@
btr;tr 0 btr;y 0
bg;tr bg;g 0 0
by;tr by;g by;y 0
2 0 1 !;TFP
1CCA (16)
17Observe that in this example scal elasticities of tax revenues and scal spending to output can
be recovered from fGI  eG 1, see Section 4.
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which is the same as in (14), the only di¤erence being the non-zero parameter 2 in the
rst column. As before, it is possible to show that the AC-SVARmodel is just identied.
This proxy-SVAR nests the previous one, which holds under the orthogonality condition
2 = 0. Hence, 2 can be estimated, along with the uncertainty surrounding its point
estimate. A condence interval around 2 can be interpreted as prima facie evidence on
the relationship between the TFP proxy and tax shocks. Notice that hypotheses of the
type 2 = 2, where 2 are guess values for the relevance parameter, are over-identifying
and hence testable against the data.
Data and instruments. Our baseline model includes the following endogenous
variables: gross domestic product, yt, real per-capita federal tax revenue, trt, and gov-
ernment spending, gt. The last series is dened as the sum of government consumption
and investment. Following Caldara and Kamps (2017), these series are expressed in
logs and per capita terms and are detrended by removing a linear trend via OLS re-
gressions.18 Thus, Yt = (yt; trt; gt)0 is the vector of endogenous variables in our baseline
specications. We also consider specications that also include consumer price ination
t and the 3-month (nominal) Treasury bill rate it, hence Yt = (yt; trt; gt; t; it)0 is the
vector of endogenous variables of our "extended" model.
As anticipated in the Introduction, we include up to four proxies (considering the
extended model) in the vector Zt to achieve identication, two scal instruments and
two non-scal ones. The two scal instruments are Mertens and Ravns (2011) series of
unanticipated tax shocks (denoted MR), which is a subset of and Romer and Romers
(2010) shocks identied by studying narrative records on tax policy decisions, and a
novel series of unanticipated scal spending shocks inspired by Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenkos (2012) contribution (denoted AG). This latter proxy is the residual of the
OLS regression of the log of scal spending over a linear trend, the spending news shocks
series proposed by Ramey (2011), and three lags of output, scal spending, tax revenues
(all in logs), and Rameys series. The idea of controlling for the contemporaneous (as
well as the past) realizations of Rameys (2011) anticipated shocks is that of focusing
on the truly unanticipated component of scal spending, which is our object of inter-
est here. As stressed by Mertens and Ravn (2014), using instruments that confound
unanticipated and news shocks may lead to a failure of the exogeneity assumption, and
therefore invalidate the econometric analysis.
Turning to non-scal instruments, the instrument employed for the output shock is
18All the results of the paper are robust to re-estimating the VAR with variables in log-levels and
including a linear trend. Results are shown in the Appendix.
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the total factor productivity series by Fernald (2014), denoted TFP , which is adjusted
for changes in factor utilization. Finally, when working with an "extended" version of
our framework which also includes ination and a policy rate, we use the oil shocks
series by Hamilton (2003), denoted OIL, which is a nonlinear function of the changes
in the nominal price of crude oil.19
Estimation and bootstrap inference. We estimate our model with quarterly
US data, sample: 1950Q1-2006Q4. This sample choice facilitates the comparison of our
results with those documented in the literature (see e.g. Caldara and Kamps (2017),
Mertens and Ravn (2014)). Moreover, it avoids us the need of facing the challenging
estimation of the scal multipliers in presence of the zero lower bound (for contributions
on this issue, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Wieland (2018)). The
SVAR for Yt includes p = 4 lags of the endogenous variables and a constant. The corre-
sponding AC-SVAR specication is obtained by appending the external instrument(s)
Zt to Yt, forming a SVAR system for Wt modeled as in (9)-(10). As already observed,
instruments alone do not generally carry enough information to identify all the elements
of the matrix eG in (8) that are needed to compute the scal multipliers. In such cases,
restrictions on the matrices B1,  and B2 will be employed to achieve (full) identica-
tion. These additional restrictions are discussed case-by-case in the next section. The
model is estimated by maximum likelihood.
Bootstrap inference on the impulse response functions computed from proxy-SVARs
has recently been debated by Mertens and Montiel Olea (2018), Jentsch and Lunsford
(2019b), Mertens and Ravn (2019), Jentsch and Lunsford (2019a), and Olea, Stock,
and Watson (2020). Elaborating on results by Brüggemann, Jentsch, and Trenkler
(2016), Jentsch and Lunsford (2019a) show that asymptotic inference in these models
is still "standard" (i.e., based on the Gaussian distribution, albeit the expressions for
the asymptotic covariance matrices of the estimators may be rather complex) under
fairly general conditions on the VAR innovations ut and the instruments vz;t. These
include two main situations that are relevant for our estimates. One is the occurrence
of conditionally heteroskedastic (e.g. ARCH-type) VAR innovations, a feature that we
nd in the data. The other is the case in which the dynamics of the external instruments
19All series but the instrument inspired by the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) paper are avail-
able in the replication package of the Caldara and Kamps (2017) paper, which is available at Dario
Caldaras webpage: https://sites.google.com/view/dariocaldara/publications . Our AG instrument is
available upon request.
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is not as in (6) but is approximated by the zero-censored model:
vz;t = Dt("1;t + !t) (17)
where Dt is a kk diagonal matrix with dummy variables on the diagonal that play the
role of zero censoring the proxy. In particular, let Di;t be the dummy associated with
the proxy vz;i;t, i = 1; ::k, then Di;t takes value 1 with probability pi and value 0 with
probability 1  pi, implying that vz;i;t can be either zero (with probability 1  pi) or can
take both positive and negative values (with probability pi). In the empirical analyses
discussed in the next section, Mertens and Ravns (2011) series of unanticipated tax
shocks, MRt, is characterized by a type of dynamics consistent with (17). Jentsch
and Lunsford (2019b) show that in these situations, the MBB method is the resam-
pling scheme which correctly reconstructs the variability of estimated impulse response
functions (see also Jentsch and Lunsford (2019a)).
Based on these observations, we apply the MBB resampling scheme to build con-
dence bands for estimated parameters of interest and the estimated scal multipliers.
Multipliers. As in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012, 2013), Chahrour, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2012) and Caldara and Kamps
(2017), we dene the scal multiplier as the dollar response of output to a shock of size
one dollar.
Let P be either the level of scal spending G or the level of taxes TR (not in logs);
GDP be the level of output (not in logs); yh be the response of log-output at horizon
h to a scal policy shock; and p0 be the impact of the scal policy shock to the
corresponding scal variable expressed in logs. Then, the multiplier is dened as
Mph = (yh=p0)(GDP=P )
where GDP=P is a policy shock-specic scaling factor converting elasticities to dollars.
As in Caldara and Kamps (2017), we set the scaling factors for the two shocks of interest
(unexpected change in scal spending and tax revenues) to their sample means on the
estimation period, i.e., (GDP=G) 1 = 0:20 and (GDP=T ) 1 = 0:18, respectively.20 We
consider positive scal spending shocks and negative tax shocks to compare multipliers
related to shocks expected to have a positive e¤ect on output.
20This denition of the scal multipliers enhances the comparability of our results with those docu-
mented by the literature. For a discussion on this vs. alternative denitions, see Ramey (2019).
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4 Results
Our exercises cover three scenarios. First, we document the empirical ndings obtained
by relying only on scal instruments for the identication of scal spending and tax
revenues shocks in our model. We then explore the polar opposite case, i.e., the one in
which we use only TFP, i.e., a non-scal instrument, to identify output shocks in rst
place and then recover the output e¤ects of scal shocks via the moments associated
to the covariance matrix of the residuals. A key result is that di¤erent assumptions
on the correlation between TFP shocks and tax revenues shocks lead to dramatically
di¤erent estimates of the tax multiplier. Instead, the estimates related to the output
e¤ects of scal spending shocks are relatively robust across scenarios. We then discuss
the link between di¤erent estimates of the output-tax elasticity and the corresponding
tax multiplier. Finally, we show that our results are robust to estimating scal shocks
by working with all available instruments in a joint fashion, i.e., we instrument both
scal and non-scal shocks with scal and non-scal proxies.
4.1 Fiscal instruments only approach
Fiscal spending shock: Auerbach and Gorodnichenkos (2012) instrument.
We begin our analysis by instrumenting the scal spending shock with our novel AG
proxy, which is meant to identify unexpected changes in scal spending. In this case,
Yt = (yt; trt; gt)
0, Zt = (AGt), and "1;t  "gt , and we estimate an AC-SVAR model
for Wt = (Y 0t ; Zt)
0 = (yt; trt; gt; AGt)
0, where therefore the last equation pertains to
the proxy. While the proxy AGt identies the scal spending shock "
g
t , we achieve just
identication of all shocks (i.e. also the tax shock and the output shock in "2;t  ("trt ; "yt ))
by imposing that scal spending does not instantaneously respond to output shocks.21
For brevity, the maximum likelihood estimates of the eG matrix along with 68%-MBB
condence intervals for the estimated parameters are conned in the Appendix.
Figure 1 (left panel) plots the scal spending multiplier obtained from this speci-
cation. The on-impact multiplier (Mg0 in our notation) is about 1.1, it increases to
21Formally, this is the constraint bg;y = 0 discussed in Section 3 (albeit for a di¤erent proxy-SVAR).
Blanchard and Perotti (2002) impose a zero contemporaneous response of scal spending to all shocks
a¤ecting output. The two restrictions are equivalent if output is not a¤ected by scal shocks at time
t. If it is, our restriction is less stringent than Blanchard and Perottis (2002). The di¤erence in
these restrictions is due to the fact that they work with an "AB-model" (Lütkepohl (2005)) which
accounts also for the contemporaneous relationships among the variables. Di¤erently, we work with
a "B-model", which focuses directly on the mapping going from the structural shocks to the VAR
innovations.
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about 1.6 after two quarters, it stays at that level for about one year, then it grad-
ually declines. The condence interval associated with the peak multiplier, reported
in Table 1, ranges from 1.1 to 2. While the just identied model cannot be o¤ered
formal statistical support by the overidentication restriction test, we notice that the
estimated relevance parameter which connects the AGt instrument to the scal shock
"gt is bAG = 0:0129, is strongly signicant, and implies a correlation of 96% with the
identied scal shock.
Table 1 collects our estimate of the output-spending elasticity, which we recover via
the expression  gy =  (fGI3;1=fGI3;3), where fGI  eG 1, and fGI i;j is the element located
in the i-th row and j-th column of the fGI matrix. Caldara and Kamps (2017) show
that the scal policy coe¢ cient  gy is negatively related to the scal spending multiplier
Mg0 for values of  gy which are below 1:8. We obtain a point estimate of  ^
g
y =  0:0029.
The associated condence interval is (-0.027, 0.025), and suggests that the population
parameter is not statistically di¤erent from zero. This nding supports Blanchard and
Perottis (2002) choice of calibrating such elasticity to zero. Caldara and Kamps(2017)
analytical derivations show that a zero elasticity implies an on-impact multiplier equal
to 1, which is in line with what we nd.
Tax shock: MR instrument. We now turn to the identication of the tax rev-
enues shock. The instrument we use is the series of unanticipated tax shocks produced
by Mertens and Ravn (2011b), which we labelMR. Since Yt = (yt; trt; gt)
0, Zt = (MRt)
and "1;t  "trt , we estimate an AC-SVAR model for Wt = (Y 0t ; Zt)0 = (yt; trt; gt;MRt)0,
where the last equation models the instrumentMRt. In this caseMRt identies directly
the tax shock "trt but, consistently with the previous case, we achieve identication of
all shocks (i.e. also the scal spending shock and the output shock in "2;t  ("gt ; "yt ))
by imposing the restriction that scal spending does not instantaneously respond to
output shocks.
The point estimate of the relevance parameter for the MRt instrument is bMR =
0:043, which implies a correlation of 27% with the identied tax shock. Figure 1 (right
panel) plots the implied tax multiplier. As one can appreciate, this multiplier is large,
takes the value of 2.1 on impact (Mtr0) and a peak value of 3.1 after three quarters.
The size of the multiplier is in line with the estimates by Mertens and Ravn (2014) and
part of the literature cited therein. The condence interval for the peak tax multiplier
- reported in Table 1 - ranges from 1.4 to 4.8. We then recover the output-tax elasticity
as  try =  (fGI2;1=fGI2;2): Conditional on the estimated model, the point estimate is
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b try = 3:36, close to that reported in Mertens and Ravn (2014) who nd it to be equal
to 3.13, and to that documented in Mertens and Ravn (2011a), which is equal to 3:7.
Moreover, as shown by Caldara and Kamps (2017), our estimate is close to the one
resulting from the sign restrictions approach by Mountford and Uhlig (2009), which
is 3. Our condence interval for  try is (2.25, 4.45). Although our intervals reect
some uncertainty about the value of this elasticity, the lower bound remarks that the
estimated size is reasonably higher than the value 2.08 used by Blanchard and Perotti
(2002), who rely on an application of the OECD methodology documented in Giorno,
Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995), and is considerably higher than the
value 1.7 produced by Follette and Lutz (2010) for the US economy. We postpone the
discussion on the plausibility of an output-tax elasticity around 3 to Section 4.3.
4.2 TFP only approach
Caldara and Kamps (2017) employ non-scal instruments to identify scal shocks. They
do so by estimating scal policy rules rst, and then they recover the impulse vector
(i.e., the on impact responses of output and scal variables) of interest by combining
the estimated elasticities with the information coming from the covariance matrix of the
VAR residuals.22 Following them, we use the Fernald (2014)s measure of TFP adjusted
for factor utilization, TFPt, which we use as an instrument for output shocks. While
such shocks are not of direct interest for the computation of the scal multipliers, the
information related to their impulse vector can be fruitfully combined with that of the
covariance matrix of our VAR to achieve full identication and recover the output e¤ects
of scal spending and tax shocks. Thus, we have Yt = (yt; trt; gt)
0, Zt = (TFPt) and
"1;t  "yt , and we estimate an AC-SVAR model for Wt = (Y 0t ; Zt)0 = (yt; trt; gt; TFPt)0,
the last equation of the system pertaining to TFPt, with innovation vTFPt .
To identify the three structural shocks of the system, we supplement the TFP proxy
with the two restrictions btr;g = 0 and bg;y = 0 discussed in Section 3, and summarized
in the structure of the matrix ~G in (14). While bg;y = 0 (scal spending does not in-
stantaneously respond to output shocks) is consistent with the proxy-SVARs estimated
in the scal instruments only approach, the restriction btr;g = 0 (tax revenues does not
instantaneously respond to scal spending shocks) is necessary for the identication of
the model. The proxy-SVAR is overidentied, and the overidentication restrictions
test returns a p-value of 0.41, which leads to not rejecting the model specication. The
22For an early study on the connection between policy rules and policy shocks with an application
to the identication of monetary policy shocks, see Leeper, Sims, and Zha (1996).
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point estimate of the relevance parameter is b1 = 1:86, which implies a correlation of
57% with the identied output shock.
As shown by Figure 1, the point estimates of dynamic scal spending multipliers
identied with TFP shocks turns out to be in line with the ones computed with the
AG instrument. The impact multiplier (Mg0) is equal to 1.1, while the peak - which
occurs after two quarters - is equal to 1.9, and the associated condence interval ranges
from 1.3 to 2.4. The point estimate of the elasticity of scal spending to output  gy
is negative, and zero is not included in the condence interval (even though the upper
bound is very close to zero). Overall, these results are close to those reported in Caldara
and Kamps (2017).
Turning to the tax multiplier, we estimate it to be substantially lower that the one
obtained with the MR instrument. On impact, the multiplier is estimated to be 0.4, and
the peak value - 0.76 - realizes ve quarters after the shock. The condence interval for
the peak tax multiplier ranges from a value slightly less than zero to 0.93. Figure 1 shows
that the drop of the tax multiplier relative to the MR case is substantial for at least 25
quarters after the shock. What is the driver of this drastic change in the tax multiplier
when moving from the MR case to the TFP one? Table 1 collects the estimated value
of the tax policy coe¢ cient  try in this scenario, which is 2.1, with associated condence
interval (1.8, 2.5). The estimated elasticity, as well as the associated condence interval,
is signicantly lower than the estimate obtained when using the MR instrument only.
The fact that lower values of the tax elasticity,  try ; are associated with lower values of
the multiplier,Mtr; is consistent with the simulations proposed in Mertens and Ravn
(2014), and with the analytical derivations documented in Caldara and Kamps (2017).
4.3 TFP only approach: Relaxing the TFP-tax shocks orthog-
onality condition
Evidence and implications for the multipliers. A crucial assumption behind the
case entertained in the previous section is that of orthogonality of the TFP instrument
with respect to the scal shocks in our proxy-SVAR. Such exogeneity assumption is
based on the well-known delays characterizing scal spending decisions and implemen-
tations (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). Di¤erently, the assumption of orthogonality
between TFP shocks and tax shocks is much more questionable, given that tax rev-
enues are cyclical. Hence, one would expect TFP shocks a¤ecting output to a¤ect also
uctuations in tax revenues. A look at the data o¤ers support to this intuition. Figure
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2 plots the contemporaneous correlations between the VAR residuals of output (u^yt ),
tax revenues (u^TRt ), and public spending (u^
G
t ) on the one hand, and TFP residuals
on the other (v^TFPt ). Such reduced form correlations point to a signicant (at a 1%
level) comovement not only between output residuals and TFP, but also between TFP
and tax revenues residuals, a necessary condition for the TFP proxy to correlate with
tax shocks. Di¤erently, the correlation between TFP and spending residuals is not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.23
We interpret the evidence in Figure 2 as supportive of a specication of the form
(15), where the TFP jointly serves as an instrument for output shocks and tax shocks.
The implication is that extra information from the data can be used to identify tax
shocks, output shocks, government spending shocks and, eventually, the scal policy
multipliers, as implied by the structure of the matrix ~G in (16) for the "one proxy for
two structural shocks scenario". Crucially, the relevance of the TFP instrument for
the identication of both output and tax shocks is supported by the data in the sense
that the estimated coe¢ cient for the relevance of TFP proxy as an instrument for the
output shock is b1 = 1:63 and implies a correlation with the output shock of 49.7%,
while the estimated coe¢ cient for the relevance of TFP as an instrument for the tax
shock is b2 =  0:89 and implies a correlations with the tax shock of -27%.
What are the implications for the multipliers? The peak scal spending multiplier
is estimated to be around 2 with condence interval ranging from 1.4 to 2.6. This
gure is slightly larger than, but not statistically di¤erent from, those found when
imposing the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition. Quite di¤erently, the impact
on the tax multiplier is dramatic, its peak value moving from 0.7 to 3.6. This latter
gure is statistically in line with the tax multiplier around 3 estimated with the MR
instrument.
Statistical support to the relaxation of the TFP-tax shocks orthogonal-
ity condition. Our results show that relaxing the orthogonality condition 2 =
Cov(vTFPt ; "
tr
t ) = 0 makes a key di¤erence as regards the size of the estimated tax
multiplier. The condence interval for 2 is (-1.51, -0.64). Mapped into the correlation
23Caldara and Kamps (2017) assess the exogeneity of the TFP instrument by regressing it over
Mertens and Ravns (2011) narrative measure of tax shocks and Rameys (2011) narrative measure of
expected exogenous changes in military spending. They document individually and jointly insignicant
estimated coe¢ cients, and conclude that the TFP instrument is exogenous. After replicating their
estimates, we veried that, when computing HAC standard errors, the t-statistic of the estimated
coe¢ cient of the measure of tax shocks increases from 1:53 to 1:92, while the F-statistic goes from 1:44
up to 1:88. The use of HAC standard errors in the regression for the TFP instrument is motivated by
the signicant rst-order autocorrelation in the disturbances.
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with the identied tax shock, this implies values in the range (-40%, -19.5%). Notably,
for each xed value 2 = 2, the proxy-SVAR is overidentied, hence testable by the
overidentication restrictions test. We conduct such test by proceeding as follows. We
consider three guess values of the parameter 2 which belong to the estimated 68%
condence interval. The values we consider are: i) 2 =  1:51, which corresponds to
the lower bound of the condence interval; 2 =  1 (central value of the condence
interval); and 2 =  0:64 (upper bound of the condence interval). The p-values as-
sociated with the overidentication restrictions test in these three cases are 0.25, 0.87
and 0.75, respectively. Hence, the data support the proxy-SVAR where the TFP proxy
simultaneously correlate with output and tax shocks. Admittedly, allowing for this non-
zero correlation does not come without costs. The condence interval for the peak tax
multiplier ranges from 0.2 to 5.9, hence it tends to be larger relative to the condence
interval obtained with the MRt instrument alone. We will discuss this issue in more
depth when we present the results obtained when using multiple instruments.
Driver of the large tax multiplier. What is the driver of the substantial di¤er-
ence between the small tax multiplier found when imposing the TFP-tax shocks orthog-
onality and the one around 3 obtained by relaxing such restriction? Mertens and Ravn
(2014) and Caldara and Kamps (2017) document the mapping between the output-tax
elasticity and the tax multiplier. In particular, Caldara and Kamps (2017) derive an
analytical expression for the tax multiplier and show that, if  try 2 ( 1; 4) range, there is
a positive correlation between the elasticity and the multiplier. Table 1 documents the
substantial change in such elasticity when the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality is relaxed,
with b try moving from 2.1 (orthogonality imposed) to 3.8 (non orthogonality allowed).
This latter number is pretty close to the 3.7 estimate provided by Mertens and Ravn
(2011a), who employ long run restrictions to identify movements in output due to a
technology shock to tackle the tax-output endogeneity bias. Moreover, the associated
condence interval (2.3, 4.9) implies that estimates around 3 that are often found in
the literature are statistically equivalent to ours. Our Appendix formally shows
the downward bias that a¤ects the estimate of the output-tax elasticity if
the econometrician misses to model the correlation between TFP and tax
shocks in a world in which such correlation is actually present.
Output-tax elasticity equal to 3: How sensible? As stated above, Blanchard
and Perotti (2002) rely on an output-tax elasticity equal to 2.08, which is the one esti-
mated by the OECD (Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare, and van den Noord (1995)). Such
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elasticity is slightly larger than that estimated by Follette and Lutz (2010) on yearly
data (1.7). Instead, our results rely upon output-tax elasticities equal to 3 or larger. Are
such large elasticities sensible? Mertens and Ravn (2014) critically review the construc-
tion of output-tax elasticity by the OECD, which is a weighted average of the output
elasticities for di¤erent tax revenue components (personal income taxes, social security
contributions, indirect taxes and corporate income taxes). Each component-specic
elasticity is a product of two elasticities, i.e., the tax base-tax revenues one and the
output-tax base one. Mertens and Ravn (2014) point out that, while both elasticities
are (somewhat necessarily) computed by relying on many questionable assumptions,
the second one in particular is typically estimated via OLS regressions that do not
tackle the obvious endogeneity issue a¤ecting the output-tax relationship. Importantly,
Mertens and Ravn (2014) show that such endogeneity issue is likely to induce a negative
bias in the estimated output-tax elasticity. As pointed out above, Mertens and Ravn
(2011a) tackle this bias by estimating the response of the US federal tax revenues to a
technology shock identied with long run restrictions, and nd a value for the elasticity
equal to 3.7. Caldara and Kamps (2017) derive the output-tax elasticity implied by
the sign restriction approach pursued by Mountford and Uhlig (2009), and nd a value
equal to 3. Overall, a value of the output-tax elasticity equal to 3 or larger does not
seem at odds with the US data.
4.4 Multiple instruments approach
As stressed in the Introduction and in Section 3, the AC-VAR methodology we work
with allows us to jointly employ multiple instruments. We then combine all instru-
ments used so far (both scal and non-scal) and re-estimate both multipliers. This
way to proceed adds further moment conditions and, therefore, information (if the mo-
ment conditions are supported by the data). Formally, we work with Yt = (yt; trt; gt)
0,
Zt = (AGt;MRt; TFPt), and we estimate an AC-SVAR model for Wt = (Y 0t ; Z
0
t)
0 =
(yt; trt; gt;MRt; AGt; TFPt)
0. To our knowledge, this is the rst instance in the proxy-
SVAR literature in which the number of employed external instruments k is the same
as the number of variables n the original SVAR comprises, i.e., all shocks in the VAR
are instrumented.
Given the role played by the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition for the esti-
mation of the tax multiplier, we analyze two cases, one in which we impose the orthog-
onality condition, and the other one in which we do not.
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Fiscal shocks: AG & MR & TFP instruments - orthogonality condition.
Figure 3 shows the scal spending and tax multipliers generated with the AC-SVAR
model with multiple instruments. The scal spending multiplier peaks at a value equal
to 1.8, which is relatively similar to those found in the one-instrument scenarios. Again,
this multiplier is precisely estimated as the associated condence interval ranges from
1.3 to 2.2. The peak realization of the tax multiplier is 1, with associated condence
interval ranging from 0.4 to 1.3. While being larger that the one estimated with the
TFP instrument only under the assumption of TFP-tax shocks orthogonality (0.76),
this values is three times smaller than the one obtained with the TFP instrument only
when the orthogonality condition is relaxed. Hence, the two ndings as far as the tax
multiplier is concerned are: i) scal instruments positively a¤ect the tax multiplier from
a quantitative standpoint; ii) such multiplier is much lower than the one documented
in the non-orthogonality case. From a statistical standpoint, this model - which is
overidentied - is supported by the data, the p-value of the overidentication restriction
test being 0.72.
Fiscal shocks: AG & MR & TFP instruments - non orthogonality. A
natural question is what happens if we relax the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition
when playing with multiple instruments. Figure 3 documents the spectacularly di¤erent
implications for the two multipliers. The impact of relaxing the orthogonality condition
on the estimated scal spending multiplier is virtually zero, i.e., the multiplier is exactly
the same as the one estimated when imposing such condition. Di¤erently, the tax
multiplier records a peak value of 2.8 vs. the value of 1 estimated when imposing
the orthogonality condition; the associated condence interval ranges from 0.4 to 4.3.
Figure 3 shows that the estimated tax multiplier under non-orthogonality is clearly
not contained by the condence interval surrounding the point estimates of the tax
multiplier conditional on the assumption of orthogonality. As before, the driver of this
dramatic increase of the value of the tax multiplier under non-orthogonality is the
impact of the orthogonality/non-orthogonality assumption on the estimated output-
tax elasticity, which moves from 2.3 (orthogonality imposed) to 3.3 (orthogonality not
imposed). Turning to the output-scal spending elasticity, our model allows us to
estimate it jointly with the rest of the system. Our point estimate, which is zero, lends
once again support to the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) zero restriction typically used
in this literature. Finally, this AC-SVAR model estimated with multiple instruments
and the relaxation of the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition is overidentied and
supported by the data with a p-value of 0.89.
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Also in this case, a note on the uncertainty surrounding our tax multiplier estimates
conditional on the non-orthogonality case is in order. While the empirical analysis
points to a non-zero correlation between the TFP proxy and the tax shock, we observe
that the uncertainty surrounding the point estimates of the tax multiplier is much
larger in this case than when orthogonality is imposed. In this respect, the estimated
tax multiplier appears less robust than the estimated scal spending multiplier. This
evidence conrms that the endogeneity issue involved with the identication of the US
tax shock is more severe than the endogeneity issue involved with the identication of
the US scal spending shock.
5 Robustness checks
Monetary policy. Our baseline model is a scal policy-only model. Research on
the scal-monetary policy mix shows that the output e¤ects of scal shocks are im-
portantly a¤ected by the systematic monetary policy in place (see Leeper (1991) for
an early contribution, and Leeper and Leith (2016) for a recent review). To control
for the role of monetary policy, we work with an enriched model featuring also CPI
ination (t) and the 3-month Treasury bill rate (rt). Hence, our vector of mod-
eled variables becomes Yt = (yt; trt; gt; t; rt)0. We estimate this model by augmenting
the set of instruments employed so far (AG, MR, and TFP) with the measure of oil
shocks (OIL) proposed by Hamilton (2003) as an instrument for the ination shock,
as done by Caldara and Kamps (2017).24 Hence, we estimate an AC-SVAR model
for Wt = (Y 0t ; Z
0
t)
0 = (yt; trt; gt; t; rt;MRt; AGt; TFPt; OILt)
0. As in the previous sec-
tions, we study two di¤erent scenarios, one in which the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality
condition is imposed, and one in which it is relaxed.
Figure 4 shows the estimated multipliers in these two scenarios. As before, the es-
timated scal spending multiplier is insensitive to the treatment of the orthogonality
condition, and peaks at a value equal to 1.8 with relatively tight condence interval rang-
ing from 1.5 to 2.3. Quite di¤erently, the peak of the tax multiplier varies substantially,
24Caldara and Kamps (2017) also employ the measure of monetary policy shocks proposed by Romer
and Romer (2004) to instrument the policy rate in their scal rules. We avoid using such instrument
because it is not available before 1969. This would reduce our sample by about 20 years. We notice that
the results we obtain with the model with ination and the policy rate and very similar to our baseline
ones. Caldara and Kamps (2017) reach the same conclusion. Evans (1992) nd that TFP measures
produced with the Solow-Prescott residuals approach are Granger-caused by monetary measures. The
correlation between TFP shocks and Romer and Romers (2004) measure of monetary policy shocks is
low (0.07) and not signicant at conventional levels.
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and is approximately 1.1 when the condition is imposed, while it jumps to 3.1 when
the orthogonality condition is not imposed. It is important to stress that this latter
model, which is again overidentied, is supported by the overidentication restrictions
test which delivers a p-value of 0.99. For this proxy-SVAR, the estimated coe¢ cient
for the relevance of TFP proxy as an instrument for the output shock is b1 = 1:69 and
implies a correlation with the output shock of 51.5%, while the estimated coe¢ cient for
the relevance of TFP as an instrument for the tax shock is b2 =  0:64 (with associ-
ated condence interval equal to (-0.98, -0.46)) and implies a correlations with the tax
shock of -19%. Overall, these empirical results tend to conrm those documented in
the previous sections with a more parsimonious VAR.
Fiscal foresight. Anticipation e¤ects are likely to be of great relevance for the
identication and transmission of scal policy shocks. This phenomenon, often referred
to as "scal foresight", makes SVAR analysis complicated. Standard VARs, which rely
on current and past shocks to interpret the dynamics of the modeled variables, can
be "non-fundamental", in that they do not embed the information related to "news
shocks", i.e., future shocks anticipated by rational agents. Leeper, Walker, and Yang
(2013) work with di¤erent scal models and show that the anticipation of tax policy
shocks severely a¤ects VAR exercises aiming at identifying scal shocks. Ramey (2011)
shows that government spending shocks estimated with standard scal SVARs are pre-
dictable, i.e., they are non-fundamental. Forni and Gambetti (2014) propose a test
for "su¢ cient information" to detect non-fundamentalness that is based on checking
the predictability of the VAR shocks of interest with information external to the VAR.
We implement their test by regressing the identied scal shocks against lagged re-
alizations of the factors extracted from the large set of macroeconomic and nancial
variables put together by McCracken and Ng (2016).25 We use two sets of regressors:
i) the rst estimated factor, which explains about 55% of the variance of the data;
ii) the rst four factors, which explain almost 90%. Table 2 collects the p-values of
the F-tests for information su¢ ciency we run over all our models. For each shock or
combination of shocks, we consider two scenarios: a) an univariate scenario in which
each scal shock is regressed over a constant and the estimated factors (rst two rows
of each shock/combination of shocks); b) a multivariate one in which the vector of
25To maximize the number of observations to compute the factors, we work with monthly data. We
convert monthly factors in quarterly ones by taking the last realization of the factors in each quarter.
Given that the factors are estimated with a sample starting in 1959, our regressions regard the sample
1959-2006.
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scal shocks is regressed over constants and the estimated factors (last row of each
shock/combination of shocks). All models pass the information su¢ ciency test.26
6 Conclusions
This paper estimates US government spending and tax multipliers using a exible proxy-
SVAR approach. Our model allows to: i) relax and test the orthogonality condition ac-
cording to which proxies must be uncorrelated with non-instrumented structural shocks;
ii) use multiple instruments to jointly identify multiple shocks.
We estimate the scal spending multiplier to be about 1.6-2.1, no matter what the
model specication and the set of scal and non scal instruments are. Di¤erently,
we nd the tax multiplier to be 3.1 when a tax instrument only is employed, while its
estimate drops to 0.7 when TFP is used as an instrument to estimate the e¤ects of
output shocks, and the tax multiplier is then recovered via the moments associated to
the covariance matrix of the VAR residuals. We show that these di¤erent estimates,
which replicate those obtained by key contributions in the literature, are due to the
imposition of the TFP-tax shocks orthogonality condition when TFP is used as an
instrument. When we relax such assumption, we nd a peak tax multiplier that ranges
from 2.8 to 3.6 across a set of proxy-SVARs with 3.1 being the estimate favored by the
data. Crucially, we show that the relaxation of this orthogonality condition is formally
supported by the data. However, our tax multipliers tend to be surrounded by larger
statistical uncertainty relative to what we document for the scal spending multiplier.
These ndings are robust to the joint use of scal and non-scal instruments, and to
enlarging the system to account for the role of monetary policy.
From a modeling standpoint, our estimates conrm the positive relationship between
changes in the output-tax elasticity and variations in the tax multiplier previously
detected via counterfactual simulations by Mertens and Ravn (2014) and analytically
worked out by Caldara and Kamps (2017). Policy-wise, our paper unveils a trade-o¤
scal policymakers might have to face when designing their scal plans. On the one
hand, our point estimates point to a tax multiplier larger than the spending one. On
the other hand, the former is surrounded by a larger statistical uncertainty. Hence,
policymakers with an aversion towards parameter uncertainty may want to assign a
26Canova and Sahneh (2018) note that Granger-causality tests might over-reject fundamentalness
because of aggregation issues a¤ecting the variables modeled with the VAR. The Forni and Gambetti
(2014) tests we conducted over the di¤erent specications of our VARs never reject fundamentalness.
Hence, our VARs are not subject to the Canova-Sahneh critique.
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larger weight to the scal spending lever than to taxes. We see the study of optimal
scal policy under parameter uncertainty as the natural continuation of this research
agenda.
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Instruments  gy  
tr
y Mg Mtr
AG only  0:0029
( 0:0275;0:0245)
  1:6531
(1:1518;2:0546)
 
MR only   3:3615
(2:2459;4:4506)
  3:0863
(1:4182;4:8065)
TFP only - orth.  0:1434
( 0:2446; 0:0441)
2:1142
(1:8285;2:4671)
1:9134
(1:2678;2:3752)
0:7583
( 0:0015;0:9313)
TFP only - non orth.  0:3430
( 0:4398; 0:1192)
3:8566
(2:3135;4:9939)
2:1842
(1:3902;2:5508)
3:5831
(0:2393;5:8781)
AG & MR & TFP - orth.  0:0053
( 0:0295;0:0214)
2:3115
(2:0936;2:6435)
1:7885
(1:3421;2:2185)
1:0409
(0:3851;1:2642)
AG & MR & TFP - non orth.  0:0052
( 0:0293;0:0220)
3:3487
(2:4437;4:3210)
1:7826
(1:2885;2:1725)
2:8299
(0:3795;4:2754)
AG & MR & TFP & OIL - orth.  0:0175
( 0:0521; 0:0029)
2:6225
(1:7481;3:2631)
1:8062
(1:5118;2:3833)
1:0586
(0:2510;1:4164)
AG & MR & TFP & OIL - non orth.  0:0174
( 0:0497;0:0014)
3:6022
(2:5275;4:8102)
1:7982
(1:4892;2:3558)
3:1246
(0:6505;4:9533)
Table 1: Estimated elasticities and multipliers: Data in log-levels. Boot-
strapped (16th,84th) percentiles below point estimates based on1,000 repetitions and
the Moving Block-Bootstrap method. Multipliers: Peak values.
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Instruments Shocks Ft = (F1;t) Ft = (F1;t; F2;t; F3;t; F4;t)
AG only "^trt 0:3612 0:2484
"^gt 0:8156 0:6457
"^yt 0:6922 0:4343
MR only "^trt 0:1414 0:1326
"^gt 0:8028 0:7641
"^yt 0:3719 0:3248
TFP only - orth. "^trt 0:3600 0:2697
"^gt 0:8942 0:5046
"^yt 0:6843 0:4088
TFP only - non orth. "^trt 0:0250 0:1128
"^gt 0:6242 0:3856
"^yt 0:1298 0:1983
AG & MR & TFP - orth. "^trt 0:4615 0:2487
"^gt 0:8104 0:6452
"^yt 0:7619 0:4432
AG & MR & TFP - non orth. "^trt 0:1293 0:1598
"^gt 0:8107 0:6451
"^yt 0:3808 0:3287
AG & MR & TFP & OIL - orth. "^trt 0:9990 0:5354
"^gt 0:3827 0:3207
"^yt 0:6597 0:4623
AG & MR & TFP & OIL - non orth. "^trt 0:1289 0:3608
"^gt 0:3208 0:3826
"^yt 0:2190 0:3959
Table 2: Informational su¢ ciency: Forni and Gambetti (2014) test. P-values
of F-tests reported in the Table. Per each shock or combination of shocks, we consider
two scenarios: a) each scal shock regressed over a constant and the estimated factors
(rst two rows of each shock/combination of shocks); b) the vector of scal shocks
regressed over constants and the estimated factors ((last row of each shock/combination
of shocks). Two lags of the factors included in all cases.
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Appendix of the paper "Are Fiscal Multipliers Es-
timated with Proxy-SVARs Robust?" by Angelini,
Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Fanelli
Output-tax elasticity, TFP-tax shocks correlation, and down-
ward bias
We focus on a simple bi-variate example that analytically characterizes the downward
bias a¤ecting the output-tax elasticity if a non-zero TFP-tax shock correlation is present
in the data.
Consider the simple tax policy rule
utrt =  u
y
t + "
tr
t (1)
where  is the elasticity of tax revenues to output and "trt is the tax shock. We address
the estimation problem of the parameter of interest  by using an instrument for uyt .
The candidate proxy is vTFPt , assumed to be generated by the equation
vTFPt = 1"
y
t + !
TFP
t (2)
where "yt is the output shock, 1=Cov(v
TFP
t ; "
y
t ), and !
TFP
t is a measurement error
independent on both "yt and "
tr
t :
By combining (1) with the instrument, we have:
utrt v
TFP
t =  u
y
t v
TFP
t + "
tr
t v
TFP
t (3)
so that by taking expectations and solving for  we obtain:
 =
E(utrt v
TFP
t )
E(uyt v
TFP
t )
=
Cov(utrt ; v
TFP
t )
Cov(uyt ; v
TFP
t )
: (4)
Equation (4) shows that whatever the identication restrictions used in the model, the
elasticity of tax revenues to output reads as the ratio of reduced form covariances which
can be easily computed with the data at hand. Notice that, in (2), the TFP proxy is
postulated to be orthogonal to the tax shock.
Consider now the case in which the equation that generates the proxy vTFPt is instead
given by
vTFPt = 1"
y
t   2"trt + !TFPt (5)
so that TFP reects not only the output shock but also the tax shock, other than a
measurement error. The relevance parameter 2 = Cov(vTFPt ; "
y
t ) in (5) captures the
A1
correlation between the TFP proxy and the tax shock. We consider the restriction
2 > 0 because, as found in the data, the TFP proxy is positively correlated with the
output shock and is negatively correlated with the tax shock.
Using (5), taking expectations in (3), and then solving for  now yields:
 =
E(utrt v
TFP
t ) + 2
E(uyt v
TFP
t )
=
Cov(utrt ; v
TFP
t ) + 2
Cov(uyt ; v
TFP
t )
(6)
This expression shows that, in this case, the elasticity of tax revenues to output
also depends on the correlation between the TFP proxy and the tax shock. It turns
out that if the data generating process for vTFPt belongs to equation (5) with 2 6= 0,
standardinstrumental variables estimation which (incorrectly) imposes the condition
2 = 0 tends to underestimate the true value of  . In turn, under the conditions
discussed in the paper, the relaxation of the orthogonality condition leads to larger (and
asymptotically unbiased) estimates of the elasticity of tax revenues to output. However,
allowing for 2 6= 0 requires that other type of restrictions must hold elsewhere in the
structural model.
Estimates of the eG matrix
We report below the estimates of the eG matrix in the ut = eG"t system for the cases
analyzed in the paper, together with the restrictions imposed to achieve identication
and the p-values related to the whole AC-VAR structure. The cells of the eG matrix
report the point estimates and the associated bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000
repetitions and the MBB method.
Fiscal spending shock: Auerbach and Gorodnichenkos (2012) instru-
ment. Wt = (yt; trt; gt; AGt)
0. Additional restriction: "yt 9 gt; p-value for overidenti-
fying restrictions: no overidentifying restrictions.
0BB@
buytbutrtbugtbvAG;t
1CCA =
0BBBBBBBB@
0:0073
(0:0072;0:0122)
 0:0033
( 0:0141; 0:0021)
0:0025
(0:0023;0:0033)
0
0:0207
(0:0177;0:0533)
0:0154
(0:0072;0:0244)
0:0018
( 0:0008;0:0037)
0
0 0:0000
( 0:0003;0:0001)
0:0124
(0:0121;0:0144)
0
0 0 0:0129
(0:0129;0:0148)
0:0035
(0:0028;0:0048)
1CCCCCCCCA
0BB@
b"ytb"trtb"gtb!0AG;t
1CCA
A2
Tax shock: Mertens and Ravns (2012) instrument. Wt = (yt; trt; gt;MRt)
0.
Additional restriction: "yt shocks 9 gt; p-value overidentifying restrictions: no overi-
dentifying restrictions.
0BB@
buytbutrtbugtbvMR;t
1CCA =
0BBBBBB@
0:0067
(0:0061;0:0084)
 0:0045
( 0:0068; 0:0037)
0:0021
(0:0016;0:0033)
0
0:0226
(0:0214;0:0295)
0:0120
(0:0062;0:0159)
0:0031
(0:0002;0:0064)
0
0  0:0012
( 0:0038;0:0005)
0:0123
(0:0112;0:0150)
0
0 0:0428
(0:0188;0:0489)
0 0:1492
(0:1292;0:1636)
1CCCCCCA
0BB@
b"ytb"trtb"gtb!0MR;t
1CCA
Fiscal shocks: Fernalds (2014) instrument - orthogonality. Wt = (yt; trt; gt; TFPt)
0.
Additional restrictions: "yt shocks9 gt and "
g
t shocks9 trt; p-value overidentifying re-
strictions: 0.4089 (1 df).
0BB@
buytbutrtbugtbvTFP;t
1CCA =
0BBBBBB@
0:0078
(0:0075;0:0091)
 0:0012
( 0:0017; 0:0005)
0:0030
(0:0028;0:0038)
0
0:0166
(0:0156;0:0202)
0:0198
(0:0176;0:0227)
0 0
0 0:0015
(0:0005;0:0025)
0:0123
(0:0113;0:0148)
0
1:8570
(1:6588;2:2557)
0 0 2:5000
(2:4732;2:8882)
1CCCCCCA
0BB@
b"ytb"trtb"gtb!0TFP;t
1CCA
Fiscal shocks: Fernalds (2014) instrument - non orthogonality. Wt =
(yt; trt; gt; TFPt)
0. Additional restrictions: "yt shocks 9 gt and "trt shocks 9 gt; p-value
overidentifying restrictions: no overidentifying restrictions. Non-orthogonal TFP.
0BB@
buytbutrtbugtbvTFP;t
1CCA =
0BBBBBB@
0:0062
(0:0053;0:0079)
 0:0044
( 0:0065; 0:0038)
0:0035
(0:0031;0:0042)
0
0:0239
(0:0229;0:0289)
0:0097
(0:0011;0:0142)
0 0
0 0:0024
(0:0011;0:0028)
0:0121
(0:0108;0:0149)
0
1:6333
(1:4205;2:1011)
 0:8906
( 1:5100; 0:6350)
0 2:4976
(2:4959;2:9134)
1CCCCCCA
0BB@
b"ytb"trtb"gtb!0TFP;t
1CCA
Log-levels
The table below reports the estimates of the scal elasticities and multipliers when data
are modeled in log-levels.
A3
Instruments  gy  
tr
y Mg Mtr
AG only  0:0018
( 0:0249;0:0276)
  1:6874
(1:1562;2:1315)
 
MR only   3:4127
(2:4173;4:4491)
  3:0896
(1:472;4:9377)
TFP only - orth.  0:1446
( 0:2621; 0:0578)
2:1512
(1:8659;2:5268)
1:8707
(1:1211;2:2814)
1:3733
(0:5828;1:6376)
TFP only - non orth.  0:3174
( 0:4490; 0:1373)
3:7103
(2:5948;4:9870)
2:1566
(1:2464;2:5188)
4:0730
(1:0001;6:5062)
AG & MR & TFP - orth.  0:0036
( 0:0267;0:0244)
2:3479
(2:0922;2:7218)
1:7316
(1:129;2:1119)
1:5272
(0:8152;1:8654)
AG & MR & TFP - non orth.  0:0037
( 0:0276;0:0232)
3:3303
(2:5368;4:2126)
1:7287
(1:1753;2:1029)
3:3570
(0:6015;4:9469)
AG & MR & TFP & OIL - orth.  0:0172
( 0:0489;0:0012)
2:7554
(1:8069;3:4249)
1:7777
(1:4935;2:3302)
1:5024
(0:4737;2:0928)
AG & MR & TFP & OIL - non orth.  0:0172
( 0:0465;0:0038)
3:7114
(2:7018;4:8641)
1:7738
(1:4661;2:3333)
3:5069
(1:1912;5:3720)
Table A1: Estimated elasticities and multipliers: Data in log-levels. Boot-
strapped standard errors based on1,000 repetitions and the MBB method below point
estimates. Multipliers: Peak values.
.
A4
 
